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ABSTRACT 
Consensus mechanism is the heart of any blockchain network. 
Many projects have proposed alternative protocols to improve 
restricted scalability of Proof of Work originated since Bitcoin. As 
an improvement of Delegated Proof of Stake, in this paper, we 
introduce a novel consensus, namely, Delegated Proof of 
Reputation, which is scalable, secure with an acceptable 
decentralization. Our innovative idea is replacing pure coin-
staking by a reputation ranking system essentially based on 
ranking theories (PageRank, NCDawareRank and HodgeRank).  
Keywords 
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NCDawareRank, HodgeRank, PageRank, Proof of Work, Proof of 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Together with bitcoin, Proof of Work (PoW) has been introduced 
by Satoshi Nakamoto [6] since 2008. After that, Ethereum and 
some other blockchains use PoW protocol as well. People believe 
that such consensus helps the blockchains to be trustless and 
secure. Unfortunately, small networks are easily vulnerable by 
51% attack 1 . Huge ones like Bitcoin and Ethereum still be 
possibly threatened as miners are centralized into several giant 
mining pools. In addition, PoW algorithm requires powerful 
computers to do intensive mathematical computation, hence is 
energy-inefficient. Another big issue of PoW is restricted 
scalability. Average numbers of transactions per second (TPS) on 
Bitcoin and Ethereum are 7 and 15, respectively. This is too slow 
for mass adoption. When those networks are busy, several 
individual transactions may take hours to days to be completed, 
and transaction fee possibly goes up much higher than usual.  
Ones proposes Proof of Stake (PoS) as an alternative to PoW. The 
idea is that instead of possessing expensive and powerful 
hardware for mining tasks, ones are required to hold or stake (at 
least) a certain number of coins. Then the network randomly 
chooses someone to be a block producer. This solution is 
obviously energy-saving but the long-range attack and the 
nothing at stake problems arise on a PoS system. Furthermore, it 
may not scale greatly if all token holders are called for verifying 
transactions and approving blocks. To solve those issues, several 
projects, for instances, EOS, Bitshares, use PoS on their 
blockchain consensus with a modification so-called Delegated 
Proof of Stake (DPoS). Some authors criticize decentralization of 
                                                             
1 Verge and Bitcoin-Gold suffered 51% attack with multi-million-
dollar loss in 2018. 
such blockchains (as pseudo decentralized models). October 2018, 
EOS faced a corrupt governance – “mutual voting scandal” [2].  
Vitalik Buterin, father of Ethereum, raises a Blockchain Trilemma 
that says about a trade-off among “security, decentralization and 
scalability”. While security and decentralization are successfully 
achieved on several existing PoW blockchains (Bitcoin, 
Ethereum), scalability is still the most difficult problem. 
Blockchain and distributed ledger technologies are in a very 
beginning stage but have a fantastic potential of application.  
Many projects are paying huge effort to build better public 
blockchains2, even Ethereum is in transition from a pure PoW 
system to a hybrid (PoW+PoS) one to speed up TPS.  
In this research, instead of solving the Trilemma, we focus on 
balance among three components: “placing security at first, 
improving scalability and offering an acceptable 
decentralization”. In the next section, we are going to describe 
DPoS in more details, analyze its pros and cons. In Section 3, we 
introduce Delegated Proof of Reputation - our novel consensus 
mechanism as an improvement of DPoS. Therein, PageRank, 
NCDawareRank and HodgeRank theories is studied to make a 
modelling framework for our targets. Assessment and comparison 
with similar ideas of other projects are given as well. Section 4 
discusses, among others, how innovative our solution is, and how 
it helps resolving vote buying problem happened on EOS and 
other issues of existing consensus protocols.  
2. DELEGATED PROOF OF STAKE 
In Peer-to-Peer networks like Bitcoin, all nodes have the 
equivalent role for transaction verification and block producing. It 
is a direct democracy. PoS is of analogous model. However, no 
pure PoS-based network has been launched up to now 3 . The 
reason may be the difficulty in solving security problems 
mentioned in the previous section.    
Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) is operated as a representative 
democracy wherein stake holders vote for a small number of 
witnesses to secure and process transactions on the network. Here, 
without loss of general idea, we present DPoS on EOS. A token 
holder must stake coins in order to vote up delegates. More coins 
are staked, more votes are counted. Staked coins are locked in 
                                                             
2 i.e. Blockchains those are not operated by a single body or a 
group but open for everyone to join the networks. 
3 Silvio Micali, an MIT professor, and his team propose a pure 
PoS project (Algorand). They believe that it can solve the 
Blockchain Trilemma. https://www.algorand.com 
smartcontracts during voting rounds. Top-21 voted-delegates will 
be the block producers (BPs) who validate transactions, create 
new blocks and maintain the network, i.e. be responsible for the 
whole network operation. A block producer (BP) gets rewards for 
his work. Other delegates in Top-72 receive little rewards as well 
to serve as standby BPs.  A BP may be voted off if missing his 
turn or be punished due to any compromise to the network. The 
punishment (possibly freezing or confiscating) is executed on the 
number of staked coins in his smartcontract. Thus, DPoS 
mechanism helps solving fundamental problems (the nothing at 
stake, the long-rang attack and weak subjectivity) of a naive PoS 
system. The rationales of DPoS essentially differ from PoW. 
• Token holders have a partially control on the network by 
their votes, and a chance to earn dividends. In contrary, PoW 
systems reward miners only. Miners may not own any coin, 
so they try best to maximize their profits. This makes a 
conflict between coin owners and mining bodies. 
• DPoS significantly reduces the cost of network operation and 
maintenance while maximizes performance of blockchains, 
particularly scalability. 
Several DPoS-based blockchains have successfully scaled up to 
thousands of TPS, for examples, EOS, WAVES, Steem. 
Naturally, PoS is energy-saving but still faces issues from 
centralized staking. Especially, DPoS model allows a small 
number of rich guys to control the network so it is not a fully 
decentralized model. Beside significant advantages, DPoS has 
several issues. 
1. Less incentive for standby BPs and voters. In general, DPoS 
system rewards the vast amount for BPs, a little for standby 
ones and nothing for voters. Votes from token holders are 
important to maintain a partial decentralization of the model. 
With little reward, standby BPs still pay as equivalent 
infrastructure cost as BPs to wait for a lucky opportunity.  
2. More centralized approach. The opportunity for a standby 
one to become a BP is small. In fact, the list of BPs (Top-21 
delegates) of EOS network is almost unchanged for a long 
time (see “mutual voting scandal” [2]). Despite of voting, 
there is lack of diversity on the BP nodes as the whole 
network operation is in control of few richest bodies. This 
contradicts the decentralization philosophy of public 
blockchains.  
3. Common voters have lack of knowledge to assess BPs’ 
performance. Proof of Stake bases on the idea that token 
(money) owners have the right and responsibility. More 
money they own, more responsibility they should pay.  
However, this isn’t always true in reality. There are many 
possible cases in which BPs commit bad actions. Since all 
delegates are public, BPs may collude to compromise the 
security of the network. Beside richness, what are 
supplement criteria that help voters choose right delegates? 
4. Application developers have no control on a blockchain, 
although their business is running on its top.  An application 
may bring thousands of transactions valued million dollars, 
but the developer doesn’t have any control on the network 
without a significant staked amount. This conflict between 
top token holders and business owners is analogous to the 
one between miners and coin holders in PoW systems. BPs 
possibly compromise the network operating multi-million-
valued applications. In that case, the developers have no 
safeguard unless they are in the group of BPs.  
The fourth disadvantage can be generally considered as the 
conflict between value makers (workers) and money (value) 
holders. In a PoW system, coin holders have no control. In a 
DPoS system, workers don’t have any right of operation 
(transaction verification, validation, etc), while they create the 
most important value for the network.  
Improvement approach: our idea is to integrate working and 
staking into a consensus mechanism, giving proportional right of 
control and operation to application owners and token holders.  
Fixing security as priority, we study how to balance 
decentralization and scalability in a model that is expected to 
satisfy all parties on a blockchain network. Then our targets are a 
high throughput blockchain and an acceptable semi-
decentralization system. We are going to present our novel 
consensus mechanism, namely Delegated Proof of Reputation, in 
the next section that can solve the current issues of DPoS while 
inherits all its advances. 
3. DELEGATED PROOF OF REPUTATION 
As proposed in the last section, we introduce working (or 
performance) factors to modification of DPoS mechanism. 
Application developers are important contributors to the value of 
a blockchain, since they run their business on its top. They 
deserve to become network operators. We mean purely staking is 
not the only way to become a delegate. We replace stake voting 
by reputation voting. What is reputation?  
3.1 Reputation score engine 
Our reputation concept is a combination of three factors: staked 
amount, resource usage and transaction activity. A node or wallet 
may govern many addresses. In our voting mechanism, a node 
must register an official address (account) for rounds of reputation 
rating and voting. Thus, in this paper, for simplicity, we use the 
terms “node, address, account” alternatively without 
misunderstanding. Instead of pure stake voting, reputation score 
determines vote weight of an account. Let see our model and 
explanation in the following. 
Vote weight = Reputation score = 𝑹𝒆𝒑 = 𝒇(𝑷,𝑼,𝑹) 
𝑹𝒆𝒑 = 𝒘𝟏𝑷+𝒘𝟐𝑼+𝒘𝟑𝑹 
P presents stake power of an account computed based-on the 
number of staked tokens.  
U indicates (CPU, RAM, bandwidth) resource usage of an 
account. Such hardware component is indispensable on any 
internet-based network, hence it should be evaluated.  
R is the most significant factor in our innovation. It stands for 
transaction-based reputation rating of an account. We appreciate 
active accounts with many (in/out) transactions. Like web-
hyperlinks, transactions can be considered as a useful indicator for 
performance of an account and the entire network as well. It 
seems no benefit (additional values) for the network if token 
holders just stake to get blocking rewards in DPoS model.  
𝒘𝟏,𝒘𝟐,𝒘𝟑 are weights adding up to 1.  
3.2 Stake power 
Unlikely DPoS, we don’t convert a staked amount instantly to the 
whole vote weight. If an account has an amount to be used for 
voting, it will be moved 10% to a staking smartcontract every day, 
then converted to stake power. 
 Assume that an account initially stakes S tokens. To avoid infinite 
division, we require a common threshold 𝜃 as the minimum of 
tokens (for all stake amounts) to be sent to staking smartcontract.  
{
 
 
 
 
𝑏𝑛 = (1 − 0.9
𝑛−1)𝑆, 𝑛 ≥ 1,
𝑎𝑛 = 𝑏𝑛 if 𝑆 − 𝑏𝑛 ≥ 𝜃,
𝑎𝑛 = 𝑆 if 𝑆 − 𝑏𝑛 < 𝜃,
𝑃𝑛 =
𝑎𝑛
𝐴𝑛
,
 
where 𝑎𝑛 is the number of tokens stored in an account’s staking 
smartcontract (i.e. convertible amount, accumulatively added 10% 
of S each day), 𝐴𝑛  is the total sum of tokens in all staking 
smartcontracts in the entire network, and 𝑃𝑛 is stake power of the 
account, all parameters are computed at n-th day. Note that when 
the number of stake tokens is smaller than the threshold, it will 
send all of them to the smartcontract, making a full convertible 
amount as the initial stake.  Fig 1 is an illustration for the case 𝑆 =
1000,𝜃 = 100, 𝑆 − 𝑏𝑛 < 𝜃 ⇔ 𝑑 > 21.8. The convertible amount 
is full, i.e. 𝑎𝑛 = 𝑆 = 1000 at 𝑑 = 22 afterward. 
 
Why does it need days to be converted to full stake power? We 
think that time is necessary for accounts to show their behaviors. 
If somebody stakes a huge number of tokens for bad purposes, 
they cannot achieve in few days because our stake converter 
doesn’t allow a strong power in a short time. For a fixed common 
threshold, larger amounts need more days to reach full. On the 
other hand, the converter encourages long-run accounts by 
accumulative stake power mechanism. Note that in our procedure, 
an account owner can increase his stake tokens anytime but the 
threshold and 10% converting proportion are fixed for the entire 
network as a common agreement.  
Since token price changes according to market demand and 
sentiment, one can set a fiat-equivalence for the threshold, for 
example, 𝜃 ≈ $100 ± 10. Once the upper or under margins are 
broken, the minimum token threshold will change.  
3.3 Resource usage 
Computer and internet infrastructure are indispensable to maintain 
any blockchain network. Thus, we evaluate CPU, RAM, storage 
and bandwidth usage. We set the optimal usage (weighted as 1) 
from 68% to 88% the available processing resource. More 
concrete, we have the following framework (x indicates the 
average resource usage ratio within one day). 
• 0 ≤ 𝑥 < 0.68 , weight increases as x. This promotes 
transactions when the system is in leisure status. 
• 0.68 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 0.88, weight equals 1. This presents the optimal 
resource usage. 
• 0.88 < 𝑥 ≤ 1 , weight decreases as x. This discourages 
activities when the system is busy. 
In this paper, we don’t give explicit mathematical formulation for 
resource usage evaluation. However, it is not a difficult task and 
will be given in the future work together with experiments (see 
Section 5). 
3.4 Reputation ranking 
In Section 2, we discussed the lack of knowledge when common 
voters assess the delegates. Staked amount (by DPoS mechanism) 
is insufficient. How well do the delegates perform over time? This 
question motivates us to introduce a performance factor to DPoS 
consensus. 
We believe that connection and linkages make value of any 
network. A node within a network is important somehow if there 
are linkages that refer to it.  More referring linkages, more 
important a node seems to be. This is the essential idea of 
PageRank [3]. Among thousands of websites, relative importance 
of a site is evaluated by hyperlinks referring to it. PageRank 
mathematically models web pages as vertices and hyperlinks as 
edges of a directed graph. Various algorithms to rank web pages 
are proposed, and they are a core part of a search engine (for 
instance, Google Search). As an efficient alternative of PageRank, 
NCDawareRank [1] was introduced in 2013 which is resistant to 
link spamming and gives a block-structure approach to the web 
graph. Another ranking theory that can be applied here is 
HodgeRank [7], which exploits the graph Helmholtzian to 
decompose every edge flow into two orthogonal components: a 
gradient flow (representing a global ranking) and a divergence-
free flow (validating the global rank). NEM project [4] introduced 
Proof of Importance (POI) based on NCDawareRank to rate node 
performance. However, we find limitations in NEM ranking 
model as well as application of NCDawareRank to rating problem 
on nodes of a blockchain network. The details are discussed in 
next subsections. Comparison and suitability assessment among 
three mentioned theories will help us to choose the best choice for 
our reputation ranking system. Then, we will build a statistical 
ranking model for a blockchain network. 
3.4.1 Web ranking theories: a comparison 
Assume the we have a set of n web pages with an out-link matrix 
𝐿 = (𝐿𝑢𝑣) where 𝐿𝑢𝑣 is the number of links from page u to page 
v. Let 𝑑𝑢 = ∑ 𝐿𝑢𝑣𝑣  is the out-degree of u. We normalize to have a 
stochastic matrix 𝐴 = (𝐴𝑢𝑣)  where 𝐴𝑢𝑣 =
1
𝑑𝑢
 if there is a link 
from u to v, and 𝐴𝑢𝑣 = 0 otherwise. Page rank is defined to be a 
vector R that assigns rating values over the pages based on the 
out-link matrix. In a simple way, R=cAR, i.e. R is an eigenvector 
(with unit-L1 norm) corresponding to the largest eigenvalue c. 
However, to prevent the effect of dangling pages (i.e. the pages 
with no out-link), the damping factor 𝛼 and a teleportation matrix 
E are introduced. Let p be the probability vector that initially 
assign an even rating (1/n) to all pages, and 𝐸 = 𝑒𝑝𝑇where e is 
the identity matrix. Then we obtain a PageRank model [3] 
𝐻 = 𝛼𝐴 + (1 − 𝛼)𝐸,𝑅 = 𝑐𝐻𝑅. 
As a generalization of PageRank, NCDawareRank [1] introduce a 
new term, the inter-level proximity matrix P, that exploits an 
stake tokens 10% / day
smart-
contract
converted
stake 
power
important property that the Web can be partitioned into nearly 
completely decomposable (NCD) blocks. Let {𝐵𝑖}1
𝑘 be an NCD-
block partition on the web graph. Any page u is contained in a 
unique block Bi, we denote B(u) for convenience. Let Gu be the set 
of pages that u refers to, and Xu be the set of proximal pages of u, 
i.e. 𝑋𝑢 = ⋃ 𝐵(𝑣)𝑣∈{𝑢⋃𝐺𝑢} . Then 𝑃𝑢𝑣 =
1
𝑑𝑢|𝐵(𝑣)|
 if 𝑣 ∈ 𝑋𝑢  and 
𝑃𝑢𝑣 = 0 otherwise. The resulting matrix is 
𝑄 = 𝛼𝐴 + 𝜇𝑃 + (1 − 𝛼 − 𝜇)𝐸, 𝑅 = 𝑐𝑄𝑅. 
In addition, M can be factorized into two extremely sparse 
matrices, making NCDawareRank computed more efficiently. 
Further, block-structure approach of NCDawareRank is the 
intuition to prevent link spamming. However, scanning proximal 
nodes is a heavy task, takes long time to complete.  
HogeRank [7] approaches the rating problem in a distinguished 
and general way. Using combinatorial Hodge theory, it exploits 
the graph Helmholtzian to provide a beautiful ranking theory. 
HodgeRank views edge flows as pairwise rankings, then 
decomposes it into three orthogonal components as followed.  
 
The first component gives us a global ranking and the sum of the 
last two terms tells us how good the rating is.  
Before going to interpretation in details, we need some 
preliminaries. A Markov chain on the pages is given by 𝑀𝑢𝑣 =
𝛼𝐿𝑢𝑣
𝑑𝑢
+
1−𝛼
𝑛
 (PageRank model). Then an edge flow is 𝑌𝑢𝑣 =log 
𝑀𝑢𝑣
𝑀𝑣𝑢
, 
and weight 𝑤𝑢𝑣 = 1  if 𝐿𝑢𝑣 + 𝐿𝑣𝑢 > 0  and 𝑤𝑢𝑣 = 0  otherwise. 
Therefore, 𝑌 = (𝑌𝑢𝑣) is skew symmetric, and  𝑊 = (𝑤𝑢𝑣)  is a 
symmetric {0, 1}-valued matrix. HodgeRank [7] aims to find a 
rank-2 skew symmetric matrix X that approximates Y and satisfies 
𝑋𝑢𝑣 = 𝑠𝑣 − 𝑠𝑢 , where V is the set of vertices (nodes) and 𝑠: 𝑉 →
ℝ is a real-valued function. Thus, X induces a global ranking via 
the rule 𝑢 ≼ 𝑣 if and only if 𝑠𝑢 ≤ 𝑠𝑣 . Furthermore, s is the unique 
score function (up to an additive constant) that assigns each node 
u a rating score 𝑠𝑢 = 𝑠(𝑢), hence the ranking vector 𝑅 = 𝑠(𝑉). 
Matrix X is the solution of the least square problem 
argmin 𝑋∑𝑤𝑖𝑗(𝑋𝑖𝑗 − 𝑌𝑖𝑗)
2
𝑖𝑗
         (3.4.1) 
HodgeRank doesn’t need the proximity matrix. In the view of 
computation complexity, the least square problem of HodgeRank 
is less expensive than eigenvector computing proposed by 
PageRank and NCDawareRank. We are going to get a deeper 
insight of the Hodge decomposition. 
Let 𝐹 = {{𝑖, 𝑗} ∈ (
𝑉
2
) :𝑤𝑖𝑗 > 0}  and 𝑇(𝐹) = {{𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘} ∈
(
𝑉
3
) : {𝑖, 𝑗}, {𝑗, 𝑘}, {𝑘, 𝑖} ∈ 𝐹}. HodgeRank theory formally defines 
a pairwise ranking edge flow 𝑋:𝑉 × 𝑉 → ℝ to be: 
1. consistent on {𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘} ∈ 𝑇(𝐹) if it is curl-free on {𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘}, i.e. 
(curl 𝑋)(𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘) = 𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝑋𝑗𝑘 +𝑋𝑘𝑖 = 0; 
2. globally consistent if it is a gradient of a score function, i.e. 
𝑋 =grad 𝑠 = 𝑠𝑗 − 𝑠𝑖 for some 𝑠: 𝑉 → ℝ; 
3. locally consistent or triangularly consistent if it is curl-free 
on every triangle in T(F); 
4. cyclic ranking if it contains any inconsistency, i.e. there exist 
nodes 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘, … , 𝑝, 𝑞 ∈ 𝑉 such that 
𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝑋𝑗𝑘 +⋯+ 𝑋𝑝𝑞 + 𝑋𝑞𝑖 ≠ 0. 
Hodge decomposition.  
Edge flows = (Gradient ⊕ Harmonic ⊕ Curl) flows. 
Divergence-free flows = Harmonic flows ⊕ Curl flows. 
The gradient flows comprise the globally consistent (or acyclic) 
pairwise rankings which induce a unique rating score function on 
the nodes. The divergence-free flows (in which in-flows and out-
flows of each node are equal) are interpreted as cyclic rankings 
(i.e. of the form 𝑖 ≼ 𝑗 ≼ 𝑘 ≼ ⋯ ≼ 𝑖 ) and of course they are 
inconsistent. The sum of the gradient and harmonic flows is the 
subspace of curl-free on every triangle and it is locally consistent. 
The harmonic component is both curl-free and divergence-free, is 
locally consistent but not globally. The last term is locally cyclic 
pairwise rankings. Naturally, our greatest concern is the gradient 
flows which induce a globally consistent ranking. However, 
divergence-free flows are useful for validation. If it is small 
(measured by a norm) compared to the gradient flows, then our 
ranking vector and rating scores are good and reliable. 
Furthermore, harmonic flows and curl flows can give us some 
insight to apply penalty on spamming nodes. 
HodgeRank is not only a good approximation to the PageRank 
stationary distribution but also a useful technique to study the 
inconsistency in PageRank Markov model. In the next subsection, 
we will discuss in more details to see that HodgeRank theory is 
the best choice for our ranking problem on blockchain nodes. 
Now, we sum up a theoretic comparison among the three 
mentioned ranking theories. 
 PageRank NCDaware
-Rank 
HodgeRank 
Proximity 
matrix 
NO YES NO 
Complexity 
rate 
X X > Y Y > Z 
Validation NO NO YES 
Spamming 
resistance  
NO YES YES 
  
3.4.2 A graph model of a blockchain network 
There are three essential distinctions between the Web and a 
blockchain network. 
1. Hyperlinks carry no value while transactions transfer 
cryptocurrency. 
2. No matter one or many links from a page A to a page B, 
adjacency matrix of PageRank and NCDawareRank models 
represents that linkage as 1. Between two accounts in a 
blockchain network, there are possibly many transactions. 
They are all worthy so should not be excluded.  
3. Within a website, subpages usually have a dense internal 
interaction while much fewer external links (i.e. with other 
websites). This leads researchers to study block structure of 
the Web graph. In contrary, a (normal) user may govern 
multiple accounts (or addresses) on a blockchain but internal 
transfering is rare, while transactions are usually executed 
with others. Thus, block structure approach is appropriate for 
the Web but not precisely suitable for blockchains. 
Gradient 
flows
Harmonic 
flows
Curl 
flows
Our target is to make a mathematical model that can represent a 
blockchain with all essential characteristics. We treat an address 
as a vertex in the graph. Each transaction is an edge connecting 
two addresses (2 vertices), distinguished by in/out transfer, i.e. 
making the graph directed. Assume that we are computing 
reputation ranking score with the following assumptions. 
• There are n consecutive blocks {𝐵𝑘}1
𝑛  collected within d 
days, B1 is the oldest block and Bn is the latest one.  
• The sum of all transferred tokens in each block Bk is Ck and 
the total is 𝐶 = 𝐶1 + 𝐶2+⋯+ 𝐶𝑛. 
• The number of all transactions in each block Bk is Tk and the 
total is 𝑇 = 𝑇1 + 𝑇2 +⋯+ 𝑇𝑛. 
• There are m accounts {𝐴𝑖}1
𝑚 with at least one transaction (in 
fact, a block doesn’t contain any address without any 
transaction). 
We remind readers that blockchain network can be considered as 
internet of value. Therefore, we take transaction amounts into 
account as priority. Contrasting to NEM [4], we don’t set a 
minimum of tokens in each transaction to be counted for rating 
rounds. This, together with zero-fee transaction, makes our 
blockchain model more suitable for micro-payment (an essential 
expected-application of Blockchain and cryptocurrency). One 
more distinction to NEM, we still calculate reputation rating of 
accounts with zero stake power (i.e. without staking). We consider 
them as popular users on the network. They deserve to have some 
reputation and they can use it to vote for delegates.  
Regarding each block, we apply a single rule, i.e. if there are 
many transfers from an account to another, we count as a single 
transaction with added-up total of tokens. Assume that at block 
Bk, account Ai transfers xk tokens to account Aj, then we calculate 
the weighted transaction as followed 
𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝑥𝑘𝜑
(−𝜂⌈𝑘
𝑑
𝑛
⌉),       (3.4.2) 
where ⌈𝑧⌉ is the ceiling function mapping the least integer greater 
than or equal to z, hence ⌈𝑘
𝑑
𝑛
⌉ is the birthday of k-th block. The 
second term assigns preference to later block with a base 𝜑 > 1 
and a shrinkage coefficient 𝜂 ≥ 0 fixed for every block and rating 
round (in NEM, 𝜑 = 𝑒 ≈ 2.72,−𝜂 = ln 0.9). Shrinkage is useful 
because recent activities have more meaning to the current status 
of the network than very old transactions (for instance, happened 
months or years ago). A transaction amount weight decreases to 
nearly zero if the number of days is large enough. Fig 2 shows 
how an amount of 1000 weighted over days, 𝜑 = 2, 𝜂 = 0.02,𝑛 =
10000.  If d is small, for instance, d < 10 (days), ones can ignore 
the exponential term.  
Varying n blocks, the total weighted (out) transfers from Ai to Aj is 
𝑊𝑖𝑗 =∑𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
=∑𝑥𝑘𝜑
(−𝜂⌈𝑘
𝑑
𝑛
⌉) 
𝑛
𝑘=1
. 
The equation guarantees that transactions with zero token worth 
nothing in the total weights. In NEM model [4], the outlink matrix 
O is given by positive net flow only, i.e.  
𝑂𝑖𝑗 = {
?̃?𝑖𝑗
∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑗𝑖
 if ∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑗
𝑖
> 0
0              otherwise
 where ?̃?𝑖𝑗 = {
𝑊𝑗𝑖 −𝑊𝑖𝑗 > 0
0    otherwise
. 
 
We have a different mindset that every transaction is meaningful 
somehow, it should be preserved in the mathematical model. 
Therefore, our (weighted) out-transfer matrix is 
𝐿 = (𝐿𝑖𝑗) = (
𝑊𝑖𝑗
𝐶
), 
normalized by the total transferred tokens within a rating round. If 
the duration of block collecting is long, for examples, several 
months, ones can apply shrinkage on Ck to obtain another 
denominator for normalization (which assigns higher preference 
to later transaction volumes) in the out-transfer matrix.  
?̂?=∑ 𝐶𝑘
𝑘
𝜑(−𝜂⌈𝑘
𝑑
𝑛
⌉), hence 𝐿 = (𝐿𝑖𝑗) = (
𝑊𝑖𝑗
?̂?
).  
If the shrinkage is used, it should be applied in computing both 
the out-transfer weights and the out-transfer matrix. 
Now, we are ready to construct a Markov chain and an edge flow 
on the nodes by  
𝑀𝑖𝑗 =
𝛼𝐿𝑖𝑗
𝑑𝑖
+
1−𝛼
𝑛
    and    𝑌𝑖𝑗 =log 
𝑀𝑖𝑗
𝑀𝑗𝑖
 .  (3.4.3) 
Note that our edge flow model exploits the reversible property of 
a Markov chain (captured in PageRank model). 
𝜋𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝜋𝑗𝑋𝑗𝑖 
According to [7], a reversible Markov chain X has a pairwise 
ranking flow 
𝑋𝑖𝑗 =log 
𝑀𝑖𝑗
𝑀𝑗𝑖
= log𝜋𝑗 − log𝜋𝑖 , 
where 𝜋  is a stationary distribution, and log 𝜋  gives the global 
ranking. Therefore, we aim to find  
𝑋∗ = argmin 𝑋‖𝑋𝑖𝑗 − 𝑌𝑖𝑗‖2, 
which is compatible with Equation (3.4.1). This implies that the 
Hodge decomposition of edge flows gives us the best reversible 
approximation of the Markov chain, and 𝑋∗ is exactly the gradient 
flows that induces a globally consistent ranking and a rating score 
function.  
Note that in our mathematical model, the quantity of transactions 
has evaluated yet. A compose of transferring amount and 
transaction quantity is expected in the next research. 
3.5 Reputation score 
Assume that from the gradient flow in Hodge decomposition, we 
obtain a ranking vector that assigns rating scores R over the nodes. 
Together with stake power (P) and resource usage (U), we 
compute the final reputation scores (Rep) of an account (a node) 
as followed 
Rep = 𝑤1𝑃 +𝑤2𝑈+𝑤3𝑅,    (3.4.4) 
where 𝑤1 = 0.4,𝑤2 = 𝑤3 = 0.3. 
The focal point of our consensus mechanism is a comprehensive 
balance between benefit and responsibility over all network 
participants. We believe that our reputation ranking system is fair 
among stake holders, resource contributors and application 
developers. Almost accounts on the network have positive 
reputation scores without any limitation or eligibility condition. 
Stake power enables token holders to gain vote weight but not 
instantly strong. They need long-run to reach maximal power. 
Resource usage reflects the hardware and internet infrastructure 
that is crucial to operate and maintain a blockchain. Reputation 
scores present the transaction and business activities, the vital 
characteristic of a network.   
4. FURTHER DISCUSSION 
Firstly, our Delegated Proof of Reputation (DpoR) can be 
considered as “semi-decentralization”, decentralization in the 
sense of reputation voting and semi in the side of delegated block 
producers. Distributing reputation ranking to almost network 
participants makes a great diversity on voters, delegates and BPs 
(greater than DPoS of EOS or POI of Nem). Therefore, no 
specific body or group has a dominate control on the network. 
Unlikely instant stake counting in DPoS, full stake power applies 
for long-runners in DPoR. Staked amount needs days to be 
converted to stake power, meanwhile the holders must show their 
honesty to be voted. Thus, rich guys cannot gain an immediately 
strong impact on the network.  
It is the first time that application developers are granted a 
controlling opportunity on a blockchain. They make the main 
value of a network via their business and transactions. That why 
we invent proof of reputation as a sophisticated balance between 
the two most important groups: application developers (value 
makers) and token holders (value owners). We also believe that 
running business is more important than holding money. Thus, we 
assign a 60% weight to resource usage and reputation ranking, 
greater than 40% of stake power. This incentivizes developers to 
build their business on the network and helps preventing 
malicious rich stake holders. 
Furthermore, our converter helps reducing the staking vs cash 
flow conflict. Cash flow measures health of an economy and 
should be promoted. In contrast, DPoS requires a significant 
amount for staking, so reduces token circulation. In our DPoR, 
staking is not the dominate factor, hence it doesn’t affect 
negatively to cash flow. Transaction-based rating, on the other 
side, is an incentive for token flows to move more actively, then 
improves liquidity of the economy.   
Note that our reputation score engine is not real-time running. It is 
computed periodically after a long period of time (for example, 
hours or days), hence doesn’t affect the processing efficiency of 
the nodes and the entire network. Moreover, nodes without 
powerful processors may refer to the reputation scores computed 
by others or separately independent machines of a third audit 
party, for instance, a statistical analytic firm.  
Table: a simple comparison (Med means Medium) 
 PoW PoS DPoS POI DPoR 
Energy saving No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Decentralization Full Full  Pseudo Med  Semi  
Scalability  Low Med High High High 
Staking No  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reputation credit  No No No Yes Yes 
Voting No No Yes  No  Yes  
Fairness & balance Med  Med Low Med High 
Incentive for node 
honesty and 
responsibility 
High  Low  Med Med High 
Boosting token flow (loop attack) problem. When staking 
doesn’t bring a great control, dishonest nodes may transfer tokens 
around accounts under their governance many times (see Fig 3) in 
order to gain higher reputation score, since DPoR appreciates 
quantity and token amount of transactions. To fight against 
boosting, NEM proposed positive net flow for POI (i.e. net flow 
equals out-flow minus in-flow if the difference is positive, and 
zero otherwise). A loop, therefore, doesn’t worth higher 
importance scores than transferring just once, despite of millions 
of transactions. However, NEM’s convention has a limitation 
when ignores the case of negative difference. We believe that 
every transaction has some meaning, so we try to preserve it by 
another solution. Equation (3.4.3) constructs the transferring (edge 
flow) matrix by ratio between in-flow and out-flow, hence 
preserves all information and guarantees that multi-transactions in 
a loop isn’t worthier than once (for example, 1000:1000 = 1:1). 
More important, the ratio keeps useful information for Hodge 
decomposition, then harmonic and curl flows show us loops and 
involved nodes. Accounts will refer to that token flows, assess 
node honesty and decide who they should vote for. Therefore, 
DPoR is resistant to boosting (and Sybil attack as well).  
 
Fig 3. Transfers in loops 
Increasing computation difficulty over time. The shrinkage in 
Equation (3.4.2) says that all transactions older than one year are 
weighted nearly zero, hence we can skip them. However, 
collected blocks within several months possibly contains 
thousands of accounts and multi-millions of transfers, while 
DPoR still computes old-months-transactions. This is waste of 
time and computation resource.  
In this paper, we review several major blockchains, their 
consensus mechanisms together with advantages and 
disadvantages. Then we suggest innovation ideas for conventional 
DPoS. Ranking theories (PageRank, NCDawareRank, 
HodgeRank) are studied to introduce a novel consensus 
mechanism – Delegated Proof of Reputation. Analysis on ranking 
theories are given. A mathematical model is constructed for DPoR 
together with extensive discussion and comparison with others. 
However, within this research, we cannot give a comprehensive 
review on advances and limitations of DPoR. Theoretical 
framework is given but experiments are necessary to validate 
suitability of HodgeRank to DPoR and to assess the reputation 
score engine.  
5. FUTURE WORK 
We know that a lot of future investigations needed to be 
conducted. We are building a blockchain based on Delegated 
Proof of Reputation (see https://umbala.network/). Experiments 
are necessary to verify our innovative ideas and theoretical 
framework before running testnet.  
Although DPoR is resistant to loop attack, we want a useful tool 
to prevent boosting intension. Millions of boosted transactions 
worth nothing while they increase block producers’ workload and 
network’s data volume. Transaction fee can discourage boosting 
flow. However, our project, Umbala Network, applies fee-less 
transaction strategy to serve micro-payment. A suggestion is 
creating a filter based on Hodge decomposition. Punishment 
(freezing or confiscating staking tokens) can be applied on nodes 
whose token flows are in harmonic and curl subspaces (i.e. with 
global inconsistency). 
A solution to avoid repeating computation on the old blocks of the 
previous rating rounds is helpful. We mean an updatable 
algorithm for reputation score computing. Online HodgeRank [5] 
gives online preferential attachment sampling and online 
algorithms to update rating and track curl flows. How can we 
apply to blockchain model and the updating problem?  
How can we add the transaction quantity into mathematical model 
of reputation ranking? A compose of transaction quantity and 
transferring amount may improve our model. More clearly, in 
Equation (3.4.2) and Equation (3.4.3), if we can use the number Tk 
of all transactions in each block and the total  𝑇 = 𝑇1 + 𝑇2 +⋯+
𝑇𝑛 combining all considering blocks, then the model may present 
characteristics and activities on the blockchain better. 
A partial reward for voters is a good incentive to maintain a high 
decentralization level in voting rounds. A more comprehensive 
assessment on DPoR and comparison with others is useful for 
blockchain application developers. 
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